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ABSTRACT
In 2006 the Federal Circuit in Zoltek Corp. v. United States denied a patent owner the
basic protections of the Constitution. In 2005 the United States Supreme Court in Kolo v.
City of New London effectively wrote the Public Use Clause out of the Fifth Amendment.
This comment focuses on the constitutional and statutory rights of patent owners in light

of Zoltok, Kolo, and 28 U.S.C. § 1498. After Zoltok and Ko]o several questions remain,
which this comment asks and analyzes. First, can the Federal Government unilaterally
take a patent owner's patent reasoning the taking benefits the economy, public safety, or
public health? Second, can a government contractor intentionally use a patented process

out of the country to evade all liability for the government to pay just compensation?
Third, can Congress strip patent owners of their constitutional rights granted to the
citizenry in the Fifth Amendment? This comment answers all three questions in the
affirmative and concludes patent owners require an amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to
curb the Government's ability to take any patent for any reason without paying for it.
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WHY BOTHER CALLING PATENTS PROPERTY? THE GOVERNMENT'S PATH
TO LICENSE ANY PATENT AND MAYBE PAY FOR IT
BRADLEY M. TAUB*

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS WITH 28 U.S.C § 1498
Inherent in the United States' sovereignty resides the power of eminent domain,
the power to take private property for public use.1 The addition of a requirement to
pay just compensation for taken property, in the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
Clause," 2 merely limits the Government's power to take private property. 3 Since

1876, courts have consistently defined patents as property interests. 4 However, a
recent Federal Circuit case, Zoltek Corp. v. United States rejects the idea that the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause covers patents as property. 5 Specifically, Zoltek
held patent owners suffering from a United States taking of a compulsory license in
their patent only course of action exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.6 This comment
analyzes how the holding in Zoltek affects patent owners and suggests patents
remain a pseudo property subject to Governmental takings only under an eminent
7
domain theory rooted in 28 U.S.C. § 1498.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. Mechanical Engineering,
Purdue University, West Lafayette, December 2003. I would like to thank my family for all of their
support throughout my life, especially my father and mother for always encouraging me to do my
best. I would also like to thank my editors, Art Sokolov and Isaiah Fishman, for all of their help and
guidance while writing my comment. Finally, thank you to the staff of THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW for their invaluable editorial assistance. Any mistakes in
this article are my own.
I United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883) ("The power to take private property for
public uses, generally termed the right of eminent domain, belongs to every independent
government."); Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) ("The right
of eminent domain, that is, the right to take private property for public uses, appertains to every
independent government.").
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensatiod') (emphasis added).
Jones, 109 U.S. at 518 ("The provision found in the fifth amendment to the federal
constitution, and in the constitutions of the several states, for just compensation for the property
taken, is merely a limitation upon the use of the power.").
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 696-97 (Ct. Cl. 2003) (declaring that patents
are property capable of being appropriated); Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 226 (1887); Seymour
v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1871) ("Inventions secured by letters patent are property in the owner
of the patent, and as such are as much entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a
franchise, during the term for which the franchise or the exclusive right is granted.").
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. (holding the patentee's only cause of action against the United States was under 28
U.S.C. § 1498 and no cause of action exists under the Fifth Amendment).
7 See id.
The court's holding allowed the government to use the patented process; however,
the court's holding did not allow compensation because it found the government's actions fell outside

[6:151 2006]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

At the moment, 28 U.S.C § 1498 contains the statutory authority for any Federal8
Officer to use or manufacture any U.S. patented invention with minute restriction.
Section 1498 also provides a cause of action in the United States Court of Federal
Claims for patent owners to sue the United States for reasonable and entire
compensation. 9 However, prior to the enactment of Section 1498's predecessor, The
Act of 1910, no adequate statutory cause of action against the United States for
patent owners existed.10
The Act of 1910 specifically waived the Federal
Government's sovereign immunity, and provided patent owners a statutory right to
recover reasonable compensation when the United States used the patented
invention without license or lawful right. 1
In June of 2005, The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New
London12 blurred the meaning of the "Public Use Clause" of the Fifth Amendment
affecting all private property.13 Kelo is the most recent Supreme Court eminent
domain case to expand the government's ability to take private property.1 4 Kelo
paves the way for governmental takings of any property if a better economical use of
the property exists. 1 5 How does Kelo, a ruling essentially geared towards real
property, affect patents?
While Kelo excludes a discussion on patents, 16 the case broadened the Public
Use Doctrine, which should affect all governmental takings, including the taking of
compulsory licenses in patents.1 7 The following hypothetical situation exemplifies
the injustice18 facing patent owners when the Federal Government's takings under
the language of applicable statute and no Fifth Amendment claim existed against the United States
for the taking of a patent license. Id. at 1347.
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000) ("Whenever an invention.., covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner thereof or
lawful right to use or manufacture the same.
); see 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 16.06[3] (2004).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) ("[The patent] owner's remedy shall be by action against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture.").
10 See Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-305, 36 Stat. 851 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 (2000)) [hereinafter The Act of 1910].
11

Id.

Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
13 See id. at 2665 (holding that the redevelopment plan proposed by the city serves a public
purpose, which satisfies the public use requirement of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
11 _d.(holding that economic development is a public use); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 33 (1954) (holding that taking land to effectuate a spacious, clean, well-balanced, and carefully
patrolled community is a public use); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230 (1989)
(holding that the breaking up of a land oligopoly that created artificial deterrents to the regular
functioning of the state's residential land market is a public use).
15 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
16 Cf Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding a patent
owner does not have Fifth Amendment cause of action against the government via the Tucker Act).
17 Id.
The implications of Zoltek lead to a conclusion that all eminent domain law developed
around the takings of land do not apply to the takings of patents, now governed solely by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 according to the Federal Circuit. Id.
18 Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1166-67 (1980). One of the many injustices to
patent owners caused by Government takings emanates from the Government's "right to take patent
licenses [without the possibility of injunctions] from doing" so. !-d. at 1166. Additionally, patent
owners must further live with government "contractor[s] engaging in patent-infringing manufacture
12
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28 U.S.C. § 1498 20incorporate the restrictive holding from Zoltek1 9 and the broad
holding from Kelo.

A. HypotheticalSituationExemplifying the FederalGovernment's Ability to Cheat
Patent Owners in More Than One Way
Suppose an independent inventor 'X' develops a process for producing an ultra
sterile material used in manufacturing surgical tools and medical devices. The
material possesses superior sanitary qualities, which causes the material to repel all
bacteria, viruses, pathogens, and harmful germs. X applies for a patent with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office eager to start a manufacturing company
based around the technology in the patent application.
Now imagine a large private surgical tool and device manufacturing company,
'P,' gets notice of X's patented process and decides it wants to use X's process to make
all of its surgical tools and medical devices. P tries to obtain a license from X but
because X wants to corner the market with the new technology, a lawful decision
based on X's patent rights, X refuses P's request. 21 Not wanting to give up, P
consults Kelo and offers the Federal Government a deal it cannot refuse.
P proposes the Government grant P a government contract to manufacture ultra
sanitary surgical tools and medical devices, using X's process. In return, P will build
a multi-million dollar manufacturing plant creating one thousand jobs and
significant tax revenue for the Government. Under the contract, P asserts it will
supply all of the government's military medical needs, and P will supply private
hospitals in furtherance of the public health. P sweetens the deal mentioning it will
perform some of the steps of X's patented process out of the country, evading
22
government liability to pay compensation.
The Government accepts P's proposal exercising its eminent domain power to
take any private property for public uses, including patents. 23 However, several
questions arise: (1) Can the Federal Government unilaterally take X's patent and
give a compulsory license to P reasoning it benefits the economy, public safety, or
public health? 24 (2) Can P intentionally use X's patented process out of the country to

or use pursuant to . . .a procurement contract with the Government" without the possibility of
obtaining an injunction from its patent-infringing activity. Id. at 1166-67.
19See Zoltok, 442 F.3d at 1345.
20 Kolo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority's reasoning was so broad
that it "effectively [deleted] the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 2671 (emphasis added).
21 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) ("Every patent shall ...grant to the patentee .. .the right to
exclude others ...").
22 Zoltok, 442 F.3d at 1347 (holding the United States is only liable for the use of a method
patent when it practices every step of the claimed method in the United States).
2:3 See supra note 1 and text accompanying; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
The
government also has the statutory authority to take a license in any patent because 28 U.S.C. § 1498
gives it express authority to do so. Decca, 640 F.2d at 1166 ("Section 1498 authorizes the
Government to take a license in any United States patent .. ").
24 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining Congress previously
determined injury "to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare" qualify as valid reasons for
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evade all liability for the government to pay just compensation? 25 (3) Can Congress
26
strip X of its Constitutional rights granted to the citizenry in the Fifth Amendment?
This comment develops the history surrounding these questions and answers all
three in the affirmative.
This comment focuses on the rights of patent owners in light of Zoltek, Kelo and
28 U.S.C. § 1498. Part I provides the history and development of eminent domain
law in relation to patent and in relation to real property. Part I also sets up the
background surrounding the Zoltek holding, which modifies all prior eminent domain
law as it relates to patent takings. Next, Part II analyzes Kelo and how its holding
affects the Public Use Clause and compulsory patent license takings. Part II also
analyzes the restrictive holding in Zoltek and how its holding limits patent owners to
one cause of action against the United States, with a slim chance of recovery. Part
III proposes a solution to the current problems with 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in light of Kelo
and Zoltek, securing the rights of U.S. patent owners. Lastly, Part IV concludes
patent owners require an amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to curb the Government's
ability to take any patent for any reason without paying for it.

II. THE HISTORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN RELATION TO REAL PROPERTY AND PATENTS

While most commonly associate eminent domain law with the taking of real
property, this section emphasizes how courts apply eminent domain to both patents
and real property. Subsection A presents the complete history of eminent domain
law in relation to patents starting with the organization of the Court of Claims and
finishing with the codification of the Act of 1910 located at 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
Subsection B presents a brief overview of eminent domain in relation to the takings
of land including the development of the Public Use Clause into the Public Purpose
Test. Subsection C discusses the recent Federal Circuit decision in Zoltek Corp. v.
UnitedStates.

A. The History of the United States Taking Patents via Eminent Domain
Government takings via eminent domain in a patent context come in the form of
intangible compulsory licenses to use or manufacture patented inventions.2 7 The

employing eminent domain); see id. at 2657 (holding economic development qualifies as a valid
reason for exercising eminent domain).
25 See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1347 (holding the United States is liable for the use of a method
patent only when it practices every step of the method in the United States).
26 See id. at 1378 (Plager, J., dissenting) (asking if Congress can withhold the remedies and
revoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment). Judge Plager continues to announce in his opinion,
"it hardly seems appropriate for this court to be the first to announce" that section 1498 (legislation)
cabined the Constitution, a view contrary to the common understanding that the Constitution
trumps legislation. Id.
27 Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 968 (Ct. Cl. 1979) ("The nature of the
property taken by the government in a patent infringement suit has traditionally been a compulsory
compensable license in the patent ... ").
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method for compensating patent owners differs from compensating land owners. 28
When the government takes private property, like land, for public use, the
government compensates the owner with just compensation according to the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. 29 Usually, land owners know of the taking because
of the physical and tangible nature of land. Conversely, for a patent owner to obtain
just compensation when the government decides to use a patented invention, the
patent owner must first discover the taking and then make a timely filing of a law
suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims for "reasonable and entire
compensation."3 0 The lack of notice given to patent owners when the Government
takes a license in their patent exemplifies one of the many hardships associated with
Governmental patent license takings. 31
While the Federal Government's power to take a compulsory license in a patent
existed from the conception of its sovereignty, patent owners have consistently lacked
a sufficient statutory method to obtain just compensation for the takings.3 2 The
history of patent owners' remedies against United States takings begins in the mid to
33
late nineteenth century, a time prior to the enactment of the Tucker Act.

28

Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) ('[T]he owner's remedy shall be by action against the United

States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation .. "), with U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing "just compensation" for private property
taken for public use).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'3028 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
'3' See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (omitting the inclusion
of a notice provision to patent owners whose patent is used or manufactured); see also LiLan Ren,
Comment, A Comparison of28 US. C. § 1498(a) and ForoignStatutes andAn Analysis of§ 1498(a)'s
Compliance with TRIPS, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1659, 1670 (2005) ("[O]ther provisions pertaining to
patent infringement, such as notice and compensation under title 35, are not incorporated into
[Section] 1498(a).").
'32 Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesell-Schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 304 (1912).
':33 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000))
[hereinafter The Tucker Act]. The Act reads in part:
All claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of
Congress, except for pensions, or upon any regulation of an Executive
Department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the
United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding
in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against
the United States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United
States were suable.
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1. Remedies Available to Patent Owners after the Organizationof the Court of
Claims
On February 24, 1855 Congress created the Court of Claims 3 4 to hear "[all
claims founded ... upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the Government of
the United States."3 5 Prior to the Court of Claims organization, patent owners
possessed no protection from unauthorized government use of their patented
inventions.3 6 Patent owners were constrained to either apply directly to Congress for
recourse,37 or, if the patent owner was fortunate, the Government would purchase or
38
agree to pay fair compensation for the use of the patent.
Once Congress established the Court of Claims, 39 patent owners could apply to
the court for compensation from the United States under one of two methods. The
first method for obtaining compensation relied on the Fifth Amendment right to just
compensation when the Government took private property for public use - in a
patent context, the Government used a patented invention or took a license in the
invention. 40 However, it remained uncertain whether a patent owner could sue the
government for violating the Fifth Amendment because in James v. Campbell the
Supreme Court declined to answer that jurisdictional question. 41 In James, the
Supreme Court noted Congress never specifically provided for a mode of obtaining
42
compensation from the United States for unauthorized uses of patented inventions.
The Court also noted the Court of Claims would be the most appropriate forum for

34
Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894); see also CHISUM, supra note 8,
§ 16.06[3].
For many years, the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction of Section 1498(a)
suits. On October 1, 1982, the Court of Claims was abolished. Its trial functions
were transferred to a newly created United States Claims Court, which was an
Article I rather than an Article III federal court. Appeals from decisions of the
Claims Court go to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, an Article III
court parallel to the other Courts of Appeal. 'Effective October 29, 1992, the
United States Claims Court became the United States Court of Federal Claims.'
During the course of these changes in the structure and name of the tribunal, the
substantive remedy against the United States under 28 U.S.C. Section 1498(a)
has remained unchanged.

Id.
'35

Sehillinger,155 U.S. at 167.

36

Td. at 166 ("[T]he only recourse of claimants was in an appeal to congress.").

'37 James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 359 (1882) ("[T]he only remedy against the United States

[for the use of a patented invention,] until Congress enlarges the jurisdiction of [the Court of
Claims], would be to apply to Congress itself."); Sehillinger, 155 U.S. at 166.
'38 Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358 (stating the general practice of compensation relies upon the
government's own accord to pay).
'39 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
40 Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 966 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
The United States
Supreme Court "stated in dictum that the owner of a patent infringed by the government had a fifth
amendment right to just compensation .... "Td. Loesona also mentioned the avenues to enforce the
Fifth Amendment rights were dubious. Td.
41 Campbell, 104 U.S. at 359. The Court of Claims in Leesona proposes that because the
United States was itself an "indispensable party who had not consented to be sued," the plaintiff in
Campbellcould had no cause of action against the Government. Leesona, 599 F.2d at 966.
42 Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358.
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such uses, if it had the requisite jurisdiction. 43 However, the James Court did not
decide the Court of Claims' jurisdiction regarding violations of the Fifth Amendment
44
and unauthorized uses of patent inventions because it held the patent invalid.
The second method available to patent owners for obtaining compensation from
the United States relied on an expressed or implied contract between the patent
owner and the United States. 45 In James, the Supreme Court recognized several
other courts allowed patent owners to waive the tort, 46 patent infringement, and
place their claim upon the footing of an implied contract, which reached the Court of
Claims' jurisdiction. 47 While the contract path for patent owners worked in theory, it
did not work in practice because most of the time the United States and the patent
owner never communicated and never established a basis for an implied contract, let
alone an express one.
The available methods for compensating patent owners left patent owners in a
dubious situation because no reliable avenue for enforcing their property rights
against the United States existed. 48 The specific question of a patent owner's Fifth
Amendment cause of action was never resolved because Congress passed the Tucker
49
Act shortly after James, which expanded the Court of Claims jurisdiction.

2. The Tucker Act Barely Improved the Situation for Patent Owners
Congress enacted the Tucker Act on March 3, 188750 to add to the Court of
Claims jurisdiction. Specifically, the Tucker Act enabled the Court to hear "all
claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States . . . ."51 However, the Act
added little in the way of patent owner's causes of action against the United States
because of the construction given to the Act in the United States Supreme Court case
52
of Schillinger v. United States.
Schillhnger rejected a Fifth Amendment taking of a patent as a claim founded
upon the constitution within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims granted in the

43 Id

44 Id. at 383.
45 Id. at 358-59 (recognizing other courts allow patent owners to waive the tort claim and sue
on an implied contract theory).
46 Seo Russell v. United States, 182 U.S. 516, 530 (1901). Patent infringement is a tort, and

torts were precluded in the original Court of Claims' jurisdiction. See id.
47 Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358-59.
48 Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 966 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (discussing the situation in

Camp bel).
49 See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 168 (1894) (holding a Fifth Amendment
taking of private property for public use without just compensation is not a claim founded upon the
constitution for the purposes of the Tucker Act); see also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d
1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining in Sehilhngor the Supreme Court did not allow a patent

owner to "sue the government for patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking under the
Tucker Act."). Zoltek holds "Sehillingerremains the law." Id.
5o Soo supra note 33 and accompanying text.
51 Sehillinger,155 U.S. at 167.
52 Id. at 168.
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Tucker Act. 53 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Harlan opined "[i]f the claim here made
to be compensated for the use of a patented invention is not founded upon the
constitution of the United States, it would be difficult to imagine one that would be of
that character."54 Nonetheless, to this day patent owners cannot sue the United
States for unauthorized uses of their patented inventions as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 55 According to the 2006 Federal Circuit decision in Zoltek v. United
States, the 1894 Supreme Court holding in Schillinger, denying patent owners a
remedy under the Fifth Amendment, remains the reason Fifth Amendment remedies
against the United States for taking compulsory patent licenses never saw the light
of day.

56

The Sehillinger construction left patent owners to rely on establishing a
contractual relationship with the United States to obtain compensation, which, as
explained above, left patent owners vulnerable to takings without compensation for
unauthorized Government uses. 57 Moreover, patent owners rarely succeeded in
58
proving a contract existed between them and the United States.
After the enactment of the Tucker Act, Government officers could still infringe
patents freely, forcing patent owners to sue the United States and argue an implied
contract existed. 59 Additionally, the Tucker Act's language limited patent owners to
recovering only damages. 60 Not until the Act of 1910 did patent owners gain

5:3

Id.

54 Id. at 179 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding the trial court
erred in allowing the patent owner to "allege patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking
under the Tucker Act."). Patent owners are restricted to remedies against the United States as
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1498. See generallyZoltek,442 F.3d 1345.
56 Id. at 1350 ("In Schiihlnger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894), the Supreme Court
rejected an argument that a patentee could sue the government for patent infringement as a Fifth
Amendment taking under the Tucker Act. Schillingerremains the law.").
57 See rahillingar 155 U.S. at 168; Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353 (affirming the Sehillingerholding:
no cause of action under the Fifth Amendment for patent owner).
5S See Harley v. United States, 198 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1905) (holding that the "there was no
coming together of the minds," thus the patent owner is not entitled to remuneration for the United
States use of the patented device); Russell v. United States, 182 U.S. 516, 535 (1901) (affirming the
Court of Claims that sustained a demurrer to the plaintiffs complaint because there was no contract
between the plaintiff and the United States); United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S.
522, 565-66 (1895) (holding that '[e]ven if there were findings sufficient to show that the
government [infringed the] patent, there is nothing disclosing a contract, express or implied; and
mere infringement, which is only a tort, creates no cause of action cognizable in the Court of
Claims."); Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 172 (affirming the dismissal of the suit because the Court of
Claims lack subject matter jurisdiction because there was no express or implied contract and the
government cannot be sued for the tort of infringement). But see United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S.
262, 272 (1888) (affirming the judgment for the patent owner because the claim was for implied
contract and not for infringement and the government was liable for fair compensation for the
consensual use of the patent owner's invention).
59 See Harley 198 U.S. at 235-36; Russell, 182 U.S. at 535; Berdan Fire-Arms, 156 U.S. at
565-66; Sehillingr,155 U.S. at 172. But see Palmer, 128 U.S. at 272.
60 Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesell-Schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 304 (1912) (holding that the
remedy available precluded any enjoinment of a federal officer for infringement).
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practical protection from government takings, allowing them to abandon the tenuous
61
and largely unsuccessful implied contract argument.

3. The Act of 1910
Congress proposed and passed the Act of 191062 to provide additional protection
for patent owners who struggled to obtain compensation under an implied contract
theory. 63 The new legislation provided a statutory means of recovery in the Court of
Claims, expanding the rights of patent owners when suing the United States. 64 The
Act of 1910 waived the Government's sovereign immunity for suits on unauthorized
uses of patented inventions. 65 Because of the Governmental waiver of sovereign
immunity, patent owners could sue the United States for reasonable compensation
66
when the government used a patented invention without permission.
However, only eight years would pass before Congress would limit the Act of
1910, diminishing the power it originally granted patent owners. 67 When the United
States became involved in World War I, it used several governmental contractors to
aid in producing goods for the war effort. Under the Act of 1910, patent owners could
enjoin those governmental contractors from manufacturing goods if they infringed
68
their patent.

William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. v. International Curtis
Marine Turhine Co. highlighted the enjoinment problems created under the Act of
1910 and eventually caused its amendment in 1918.69 In Cramp, the government
contracted with a ship company to build torpedo boat destroyers. Unfortunately for
Cramp, the Turbine Company owned several patents on the turbine engine proposed
for use in the destroyer's design.70 When the Turbine Company found out about the
contract, they sued and obtained an injunction preventing Cramp from using the

61 TheActof 1910.
62

Id.

The act read in part: "[t]hat whenever an invention . . . covered by a patent of the

United States shall hereafter be used by the United States without license of the owner thereof or
lawful right to use the same, such owner may recover reasonable compensation for such use by suit
in the Court of Claims ...." Id.
6 Crozier,224 U.S. at 303 (explaining that the enactment of The Act of 1910 emerged from
the Tucker Act problems because under the Tucker Act it was only possible to sue the United States
on contract theories and not tort).
64 The Act of 1910.
65 Id. ([W]henever an invention . . . shall hereafter be used by the United States ...
(emphasis added).
66 Id. ([O]wner may recover reasonable compensation for such use by suit in the Court of
Claims .. ").
67 See Act of July 1, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-182, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1498 (2000)) [hereinafter The Act of 1918].
68
Soo The Act of 1910 (omitting a provision preventing patent owners from obtaining
injunctions against the United States).
69 William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. Int'l Curtis Marine Turbine Co., 246 U.S.
28, 37 (1918).
70 Id. at 36.
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patented turbine engine. 71 Immediately after Cramp the Government realized the
Act of 1910's potential catastrophic effect on the production of wartime goods and
72
asked Congress to help.

4. The Act of 1918, Amending the Act of 1910
Future president Franklin D. Roosevelt, the then United States Navy Acting
Secretary, wrote a letter to Congress detailing the shortcomings of the Act of 1910.73
Roosevelt cited difficulties in procuring goods from private manufacturers, necessary
74
to meet military requirements of World War I, as the reason for an amendment.
The letter detailed how government contractors refused to supply the government
because of the potential exposure to litigation involving the possibilities of
75
injunctions and damages.
Congress responded to Roosevelt's letter less than four months after Cramp,
passing the Naval Appropriation Bill, the Act of July 1, 1918, amending the Act of
1910.76 The amendment specifically provided patentees' sole remedy against an
infringing government contractor was to sue the United States in the Court of
Claims. 77 The Act of 1918 effectively did two things. First, it completely relieved
government contractors from liability "for the infringement of patents in
manufacturing anything for the Federal Government .. "...
78 Second, the Act limited

71 Id. at 28 (holding the defendant liable for infringing while performing under a government

contract).
72 See generally Wood v. Atl. Gulf & Pac. Co., 296 F. 718, 720-21 (S.D. Ala. 1924) (discussing
Franklin D. Roosevelt's letter to Congress asking for an amendment to The Act of 1910).
73 Id.
74 TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
7, Wood, 296 F. at 721. The letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Benjamin R. Tillman dated
April 20, 1918 reads in part:
The situation promised serious disadvantage to the public interests, and in order
that vital activities of this department may not be restricted unduly at this time,
and also with a view of enabling dissatisfied patentees to obtain just and adequate
compensation in all cases conformably to the declared purpose of said act, I have
the honor to request that the act be amended by the insertion of a proper
provision therefor in the pending naval appropriation bill.

Id.
76 The Act of 1918. See Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331,
345 (1928) ("The intention and purpose of Congress in The Act of 1918 was to stimulate
contractors to furnish what was needed for the War, without fear of becoming liable
themselves for infringements to inventors or the owners or assignees of patent."); see also
Wood, 296 F. at 720 (explaining how the holding in Cramp implored Congress to prevent
patent owners from enjoining government contractors manufacturing goods necessary for
war).
77 TVIEnergy Corp., 806 F.2d at 1060; see also The Act of 1918 ("That whenever an invention
... covered by a patent of the United States shall hereafter be used or manufaetured by or for the
UnitedStates without license or lawful right .. ")(emphasis added).
78 RihmondScrew,275 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added).
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patent owners' causes of action to those against the United States in the Court of
79
Claims for reasonable and entire compensation.

5. The Scope of28 U.S.C.§ 1498
28 U.S.C. § 1498 codifies the Act of 1910, including its 1918 amendment, in
substantially the same form in which it existed when enacted.8 0 28 U.S.C. § 1498
harnesses the Government's sovereign eminent domain power, permitting the
Government to use or manufacture patented devices only in exchange for reasonable
81
and entire compensation to the patent owner.
The Federal Government takes compulsory licenses in patents under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 without restrictions and without penalties private infringers accrue under
Title 35.82
For instance, patent owners cannot obtain treble damages or an
injunction in a suit against the United States for a taking.8 3 The United States does
not infringe patents.8 4 It takes a compulsory license in the patent under its eminent
domain power and must only provide just compensation for the taking.85 Just

79 Id. (stressing the point that the addition of the word "entire" to The Act of 1918 emphasized
the exclusive and comprehensive character of the remedy under the amended law); see also The Act
of 1918 ("[S]uch owner's remedy shall be by suit against the United States in the Court of Claims for
the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture ....
(emphasis added).
80 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 700-01 n.22 (Ct. Cl. 2003) (explaining the Act
of 1910 as amended by the Act of 1918 was originally codified in Title 35 but was moved to Title 28
during the 1948 revision). 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) reads in part as follows:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States
is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner
thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall
be by action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal
Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use
and manufacture.
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
81 Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (explaining 28
U.S.C. § 1498 is "an eminent domain statute, which entitles the Government to manufacture or use
a patented article becoming liable to pay compensation to the owner of the patent.").
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
8:3 Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Title 35 (Patents) allows
for remedies such as injunction and increased damages which are not permissible under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 because that would grant the plaintiff a recovery in excess of just compensation as required
by the Fifth Amendment and in excess of the reasonable and entire compensation authorized by
Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Id See also 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000) ("The several courts having
jurisdiction of cases under this title [35 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] may grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the
court deems reasonable."); see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) ("When the damages are not found by a
jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed.").
81 Leesona, 599 F.2d at 967 (stating the government takes a license in the patent as a rightful
exercise of eminent domain and an injunction is not available). "When the [G]overnment has
infringed, it is deemed to have 'taken' the patent license under an eminent domain theory.
d.
at 964.
85 Id.at 964 ("[C]ompensation is the just compensation required by the [F]ifth [A]mendment.").
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compensation, under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, is generally a "reasonable royalty"8 6 for the
license the Government took.S7 Next, subsection B discusses eminent domain and its
development through the government's taking of land.

B.

The History of the UnitedStates Taking Land Via Eminent Domain

In 1870, the Supreme Court of the United States held private property includes
United States patents.8 8
That holding developed into the Government taking
licenses in any patent under its eminent domain power, a power inherent in its
sovereignty.8 9 Congress solidified the law of eminent domain regarding the takings
of patents about a century ago when it enacted the Act of 1910.90 However, the
following subsections demonstrate how the law of eminent domain regarding the
taking of land remains volatile. 91

1. Eminent Domain: Two Restrictions, The Public Use Clause and Just
Compensation:The development ofPublic Use into Public Purpose
The United States sovereign power of eminent domain allows the Federal
Government to take any private property. 92 The only limitation of the United States
eminent domain power emanates from the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 93 The United States Government can only take private property for
public use and the Government must pay Just compensation for the taking. 94 The
following two polar scenarios establish a base for discussing the historical

86 Id. at 973. The preferred method for determining a reasonable royalty is the comparative
royalty technique where the court looks at what other licensees pay the patent owner as a royalty.
Id. The reasonableness and fairness of the determined just compensation is monitored by
comparing the determined amount an estimated reasonable royalty on a proper compensation base
and then testing that amount by comparing it to other available measures like savings to the
Government and lost profits. Id.
87 See id. (stating that when a reasonable royalty cannot be ascertained there are several
other methods that can be employed to determine reasonable and entire compensation owed to the
patent owner). See, e.g., Tekronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349 (1977) (determining the
reasonable royalty by holding a hypothetical negotiation between a willing buyer and willing seller);
Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 186-87 (1976) (determining the royalty rate by using rates
offered by the patent owner to other companies attempting to obtain a license); Calhoun v. United
States, 453 F.2d 1385, 1395 (1972) (asserting that when commercial royalty rates are established
that represent fair market value, no addition to the rate will be added for litigation difficulties, nor
will attorney fees nor expenses cause the rate to rise).
88 Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1871) (holding patents are property).
89 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
90 The Act of 1910.
91 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665-66 (2005) (exemplifying the
changes of eminent domain holding economic redevelopment as a valid public purpose satisfying the
public use requirement of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
92 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
93 See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
94 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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development of the Government's ability to take property as limited in the Fifth
Amendment.9
In scenario one, the Fifth Amendment forbids the United States from taking
private property from private party 'A' for the sole purpose of giving it to another
private party 'B,' even if 'A' receives just compensation. 96 In scenario two, the United
States may transfer property from one private party to another private party if the
public may use the property in the future. 97 Scenario two exemplifies the "Use by the
98
Public Test" and courts continued to apply it until the mid-nineteenth century.
Originally, many state courts applied the Use by the Public Test to determine
the constitutionality of the sovereign's taking; however, in the mid-nineteenth
century, many state courts circumvented or abandoned the test completely because of
difficultly in its administration. 99 For example, courts toiled with questions such as:
how much of the condemned land must the public use in the future, how much of the
public needs access to the land, and at what cost. 100 Due to the application
difficulties and inadequacy of the Use by the Public Test, the U.S Supreme Court
°
adopted the Public Purpose Test at the close of the nineteenth century 101
10 2
In FalbrookIrrigationDistrict v. Bradley the U.S. Supreme Court embraced
the Public Purpose 103 interpretation of the Public Use Clause, and in Strickley v.

9 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
96 Id. at 2662; see e.g., Brest v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 194 So. 2d 658, 662 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967) ("The court acknowledged the general rule to be that a public body may not use its
power of eminent domain to acquire property for the sole purpose of making such property available
to private enterprises for private use.").
97 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 (stating an example when the Government uses the power of
eminent domain to give the railroad, or any common carrier, land to build on which will be open to
the public at large to use the land in the future); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244
(1984) (stating that the public use requirement does not literally require all condemned property to
be put into use for the general public, a taking that satisfies a valid public purpose will satisfy the
requirement).
98 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662.
99 Id. (suggesting that the use by the public test meant that the court would look to see if the
land being taken would actually be used by the public in the future to satisfy the Public Use Clause).
The Use by the Public Test also proved to be impractical because the needs of society were always
changing and evolving with the time. Id. See also Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11
Nev. 394, 405 (1876) (rejecting the use by the public interpretation of the Public Use Clause because
it would cripple the legislature and prevent the beneficial influence on the welfare and prosperity of
the state).
100 Klo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662.
101 Id. When the U.S. Supreme Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the states at
the close of the nineteenth century, it embraced the broader public purpose test over the narrow use
by the public test. Id. See also Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906)
(stressing the inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test to meet the Public Use
Clause).
102 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
10:3 Id. at 161-62 (holding that taking land not to be used by the public is not fatal as long as
the taking is a public purpose and a matter of public interest); see Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673
(O'Conner, J., dissenting) ('[J]n certain circumstances and to meet certain exigencies, takings that
serve a publiepurpose also satisfy the Constitution even if the property is destined for subsequent
private use.") (emphasis added); see, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (holding that
taking land to effectuate a spacious, clean, well-balanced, and carefully patrolled community
benefits the public welfare and is permissible under the Government's eminent domain power); see,
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Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.,104 the Court left no uncertainty that the Public
Purpose interpretation of the Public Use Clause replaced all preceding ones. 10 5 From
its inception, the Public Purpose Test blurred the line of permissible and
impermissible takings, because it deviated from the straightforward test - if the
10 6
public can use the land, then the taking satisfies the Public Use Clause.
Specifically, the Public Purpose interpretation strays from the enumerated words in
the Fifth Amendment, namely "Public Use."10 7

Additionally,

courts have the

authority to stretch the definition of permissible public purposes to find a legislative
1 08

taking constitutional.

e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1989) (holding that when the exercise of the
power of eminent domain is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, a compensated taking
has never been held to be prohibited by the Public Use Clause). The Court in Kelo defied the
understanding the Framers of the Constitution allowed the government to take private property for
public use and not public necessity, when they replaced public use with public purpose. Kelo, 125 S.
Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104 Striekloy, 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
105 Id. at 531 (holding that a mining company's use of an aerial bucket line to transport ore
over private property was a valid public purpose satisfying the public use requirement); Clark v.
Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1905) (holding that a statute that authorized the owner of arid land to
widen a ditch on his neighbor's land was a valid public purpose and it met the requirement of public
use); see Hous. Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Castle, 79 Haw. 64, 83 (1995) (holding "one person's property
may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifyingpubhiepurposo,even
though compensation be paid."). When "the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be

proscribed by the Public Use Clause." id. Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n, 306 F.3d 445, 462 (7th Cir.
2002) (holding "even takings that transfer property from one private person to another have been
deemed valid as long as there is a public purpose underlying the transfer."); Besig v. Friend, 463 F.
Supp. 1053, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding a "transfer of property by the state is not a 'gift' in
violation of this constitutional provision if the transfer is supported by adequate consideration or if
the transfer serves a valid public purpose."); Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1338
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding the government's transfer of development rights was proper and
reasonably related to a valid public purpose to protect the beachfront property); Scott v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1597, 1604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding "expenditures of public funds
or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning of the
constitutional prohibition if those funds are expended for a public purpose.").
106See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 'public purpose' standard is not
susceptible of principled application."). The U.S. Supreme Court embraced public purpose as the
more natural and more broad interpretation of the public use requirement when it began to apply
the Fifth Amendment to the States at the closing of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Fallb±rook,164
U.S. at 158-64 (1896).
107Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("When we depart from the natural import
of the term 'public use,' and substitute for the simple idea of a public possession and occupation, that
of public utility, public interest, common benefit, general advantage or convenience ...we are afloat
without any certain principle to guide us.").
108 Id. at 2663. For example, the Court in Kelo stretched the meaning of public purpose to
include economic development as a constitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Soo id. at
2666-67. Whether economic development can be a reason to take a license in a patent is yet to be
determined; however, "where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the
Public Use Clause." Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241.
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2. Kelo - Expanding the Public Purpose Test
In Kelo v. City of New London, the issue facing the Supreme Court asked
10 9
whether the city's proposed economic revitalization plan of private property
satisfied the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a valid public purpose. 110
The Court held the city's plan unquestionably served a public purpose, 1 forcing the
11 2
plaintiff home owners out of their homes.
In Kelo, the Court began its analysis of Public Use looking at the two polar
scenarios11 3 mentioned above, and decided Kelo did not fall in either situation
because the general public would not have access to the condemned land, and
because the taking was not purely private.1 14 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
11 5
considered whether the taking satisfied a recognized public purpose.
16
In order to make its decision, the Court relied on Berman v. Parker"
and
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,117 both cases upheld controversial takings
because both cases found valid public purposes.1 18 Following its precedents in

109 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. The property referred to in Kelo was fifteen pieces of land that
was owned by nine petitioners in Fort Trumbull, which is an area situated on a peninsula that juts
into the Thomas River in Connecticut. Id.
110 Id. at 2661. Kelo was an issue of first impression for the Court. Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (deciding whether economic development takings are constitutional). Klo was also the
first time in over twenty years the Court had to decide if a purported public purpose met the public
use requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Id. "Promoting economic development is a traditional
and long accepted function of government." Id. at 2665. "Clearly, there is no basis for exempting
economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose." Id. at 266566.
HI Id. at 2665. The redevelopment plan was based around a privately held drug company who
was going to move to the area and build a multi-million dollar facility, creating many new jobs and
generating tax revenue. Id. at 2659.
112 See Id. at 2665.
There were nine plaintiffs that owned fifteen properties that were
subjected to the city's takings. Id. at 2660. There was no allegation that the properties were
blighted or in bad condition, they were only taken because of their location in the prospective
development area. Id. One plaintiff was born in her house and lived there since 1918 and others
bought more recently and made extensive improvements to their land. Id.
113 Id. at 2661. Recall that Scenario one embraced the general rule that a public body may not
use its power of eminent domain to acquire property for the sole purpose of making such property
available to private enterprises for private use. Id. Also recall, Scenario two embraced the general
rule that land taken by eminent domain and given to a private party to be developed and used by
the public in the future will also satisfy the public use requirement. Id.
M' Id. at 2661-62 (stating that condemned property does not have to be put to use for the
general public; yet a purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use
requirement).
115 Id. at 2662-63. The Court did not apply the "Use by the Public" test because the Public
Purpose test was the more broad and natural interpretation of Public Use as public purpose. Id.
Analyzing its prior decisions, the Court noted that the narrow use by the public test has been
rejected consistently since Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., in favor of the broad public
purpose test. Id.
116 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
117 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
118 Kolo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663-64; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 35 (holding the condemnation of
land to redevelop a blighted area of Washington, D.C. satisfies the public use requirement as a valid
public purpose); Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241-42 (holding eliminating the social and economic evils of a
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Berman and Midkiff the Supreme Court concluded in Kelo that economic
development undoubtedly served a public purpose, which accordingly satisfied the
Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 119 The holding in Kelo expanded the
meaning of the Public Use Clause in the Fifth Amendment, but whether that holding
affects the United States' ability to take compulsory patent licenses looks dim after a
120
review of the per curium opinion in Zoltek Corp. v. United States.

C. How Zoltek Corp. v. United States Affects Patent Owners Rights Against the
UnitedStates FederalGovernment
Subsections A and B above detail the history of eminent domain as it relates to
the takings of compulsory patent licenses and land respectively. To this point, this
comment has assumed the case law developing eminent domain in land cases applies
to takings in patent cases. Many patent cases discussing United States takings
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 refer to eminent domain stating the statute embraces its
power including the Fifth Amendment's limitations. 121 Justice Plager provides an
explanation of how 28 U.S.C. § 1498 embraces eminent domain. Plager states "[t]he
Government can exercise its power of eminent domain and . . . 'take' the property it
needs for a public use. In effect, the Government forcibly acquires a license to use
the invention. However, because of the Constitution, the Government may do this
122
only if it pays the Just compensation demanded by the Fifth Amendment."
Contrarily, the majority's view in Zoltek leads the discussion on eminent domain
relating to patents down a whole new road.1 23 The majority in Zoltek relied on
1 24
Sehillinger.
In Sehillinger the Supreme Court rejected an argument that a patent
owner could sue the United States for patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment
taking under the Tucker Act. 125 The majority then summarily stated Sehillinger
land oligopoly qualified as a valid public use even though the land was taken from one private
person and given directly to another private person).

119 Klo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664 (noting for more than a century its public use jurisprudence has
wisely favored giving the legislature broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use
of takings and that it should resolve the landowner's challenges as a whole and not on a piecemeal
basis).
120
121

So Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1351-53 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950). 28 U.S.C. § 1498

is "an eminent domain statute, which entitles the Government to manufacture or use a patented
article becoming liable to pay compensation to the owner of the patent." Id. Leesona Corp. v.
United States, 599 F.2d 958, 967 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (stating the government takes a license in the patent
as a rightful exercise of eminent domain without a possibility of an injunction). "When the
[G]overnment has infringed, it is deemed to have 'taken' the patent license under an eminent
domain theory .... ." Id. at 964; Zoltok, 442 F.3d at 1374 (Plager, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen the
wrongful use is committed by the United States Government (or its agents), such suit is not brought
under Title 35 but under Title 28, section 1498.").
122 Zoltok, 442 F.3d at 1374 (Plager, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
123
So Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353 (holding no Fifth Amendment claims for patent owners
against United States takings). See also Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesell-Schaft, 224 U.S. 290,
304 (1912) (explaining the Government takes compulsory licenses in patented inventions under 28
U.S.C. § 1498 and its predecessor, the Act of 1910).
121 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350.
125 Id.
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remains the law. 12 6 The majority's analysis effectively wrote the Fifth Amendment
out of patent owners' bundle of rights because of a case over a hundred years old
applying law now understood in a different light. 127
Justice Plager points out in his dissent Schillinger was correct because at the
time it was decided judicial treatment of the Tucker Act was still in its early stages of
development. 128 However, Plager explains not until Jacobs v. United States did the
idea of a separate non-statutory constitutional basis for a taking remedy under the
Fifth Amendment emerge. 129 Until the Supreme Court steps in, the disagreement as
to whether a patent owner has a cause of action against the United State for taking a
130
compulsory patent license other than 28 U.S.C. § 1498 remains uncertain.
Additionally, Zoltek involved a taking where the United States hired Lockheed
Martin Corporation ("Lockheed") to design and build the F-22 fighter. 13 1 Following
its precedent in NTPInc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., the Federal Circuit held "direct
infringement under Section 271(a) is a necessary predicate for government liability
under Section 1498."132 Thus, because Lockheed performed some of the patent
owner's patented process outside of the United States, the United States escaped all
liability to pay reasonable and entire compensation as required in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498.133 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Plager argued the per curium opinion errs
because nothing in Section 1498(a) requires each and every step of a claimed process
be performed in the United States. 13 4 Unless the Supreme Court steps in and revisits
NTP and Zoltek, patent owners' rights will remain easily avoided by contracting to
perform at least one of the patented process' steps out of the country.

126 Id.
127 Id.

at 1376 (Plager, J., dissenting) (explaining the law on takings after Jacobs changed the
view of courts and since 1933 courts understand a taking to not be a tort nor a contract, but a
separate claim arising out of the self-executing language of the Fifth Amendment).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130
Compare

id. at 1378 (explaining the majorities opinion that section 1498 is the "sole
remedy for a taking of a patent right."), with id. (explaining Plager's view "the existence of a proper
takings claim is an issue wholly independent of whether under [section] 1498 there is a valid claim
that triggers a remedy under that statute.").
1:31Id. at 1349.
132 Id. at 1350.
1:3:3See id. at 1347 (holding the United States is only liable for the use of a method patent
when it practices every step of the claimed method in the United States).
131 Id. at 1379 (Plager, J., dissenting).
[T]hat notion is come to only by incorporating into § 1498(a) the requirement for
infringement by a private party under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ....
Contrast that with
the actual language of § 1498(a): "Whenever a [patented] invention is used .. . by
or for the United States . . . without lawful right ... the owner's remedy shall be
by action against the United States." Section 1498(a) simply does not contain the
same territorial limitation on infringement as § 271(a). Congress obviously knew
how to write limiting language when it wanted to; its absence means that there is
nothing in subsection (a) of § 1498 that requires that the infringing activity, or
any part of it, take place in the United States; that is the role played by
subsection (c), discussed below.

[6:151 2006]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

III. ANALYSIS
The drafters of the United States Constitution granted Congress the power to
develop a patent system to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 135 The
patent system encourages development and progress through grants of letter patents
to patent owners, which include the right to exclude anyone else from making, using,
offering to sell, or selling any patented invention.136
The patent laws bind individuals and the United States government; however,
because the Federal Government does not infringe patent rights, 13 7 it cannot violate
Section 271 of the Patent Act. 138 Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 governs United States
takings, which limits the United States' ability to take a compulsory license in a
patent, requiring the United States to pay patent owners reasonable and entire
1 39
compensation.
The restrictions imposed on the Federal Government in the Fifth Amendment
and Section 1498 are necessary because otherwise the United States would have
1 40
power to take a patent owner's invention without paying just compensation.

1:35See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
136 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). In part the statute says: "Every patent shall ... grant to the
patentee ... the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States." Id. See also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002). The monopoly that the patent grants to the patentee is the property right
that is capable of being appropriated. Id.
1:37 Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 67 (1885).
The Constitution
guarantees private property, including patent rights, are protected from the Government's
appropriation:
[T]he right of the patentee, under letters patent for an invention granted by the
United States, was exclusive of the government of the United States as well as of
all others, and stood on the footing of all other property, the right to which was
secured, as against the government, by the constitutional guaranty which
prohibits the taking of private property forpublic use without compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
138 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
1:39 See supra note 85 and accompanying text; Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F.
Supp. 633, 635 (1950) ("28 U.S.C. § 1498, is in effect, an eminent domain statute, which entitles the
Government to manufacture or use a patented article becoming liable to pay compensation to the
owner of the patent."); Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 968 (Ct. Cl. 1979) ("[Just
compensation has in most cases been defined by a calculation of a 'reasonable royalty' for that
license.").
110 See supra notes 1, 3 and accompanying text. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating the
government cannot take private property, including patent rights, without paying just compensation
and the taking must be for a public use). James v. Campbell clarified the government must
compensate a patent owner for taking a compulsory patent license. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S.
356, 357-58 (1882).
That the government of the United States when it grants letters-patent for a new
invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an exclusive property
in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the
government itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or
use without compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser,
we have no doubt. The Constitution gives to Congress power "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," which
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Fortunately, the Constitution's drafters included the Fifth Amendment, making a
governmental taking of a compulsory license in a patent unconstitutional without
paying just compensation.

141

Theoretically, the United States must also take a compulsory license in a patent
for a public use; however, no such express requirement exists in 28 U.S.C. § 1498.142
Unfortunately for patent owners, the Federal Circuit's decision in Zoltek Corp. v.
United States held the Fifth Amendment plays no role in determining compensation
to patent owners when the United States takes a compulsory license in their
patented inventions, leaving patent owners guessing whether the United States must
conform to the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause or if the United States may
simply take any patent for any reason. 143 Next, subsection A looks at the Public Use
Clause as deteriorated in Kelo and suggests the small-time inventor X in the
hypothetical above remains subject to losing not only his house, but also his exclusive
rights in his patent for economic development.

A. Kelo Confirms the PublicPurpose Test Allows the UnitedStates to Take Any
Propertyfor Any Reason Only Subject to PayJust Compensation
In the hypothetical in the introduction, X patented an invention of unimaginable
financial value. P, the large manufacturing company, easily convinced the Federal
Government to harness its broad eminent domain powers under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and
take a compulsory license in X's patented invention and hire P to produce goods
using the patented process for the Government and the public. Upon what basis did
the Government rely for the taking? Did the taking comply with the Public Use
Clause of the Fifth Amendment? This comment will now evaluate the Public Use
Clause from its inception through the Supreme Court's holding in Kelo and
unfortunately conclude that virtually any reason the Government takes a license in a
patent satisfies the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

could not be effected if the government had a reserved right to publish such
writings or to use such inventions without the consent of the owner. Many
inventions relate to subjects which can only be properly used by the government,
such as explosive shells, rams, and submarine batteries to be attached to armed
vessels. If it could use such inventions without compensation, the inventors could
get no return at all for their discoveries and experiments. It has been the general
practice, when inventions have been made which are desirable for government
use, either for the government to purchase them from the inventors, and use them
as secrets of the proper department; or, if a patent is granted, to pay the patentee
a fair compensation for their use.
Id. See also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Plager, J.,
dissenting) ('[P]laintiffs non-frivolous allegation of a constitutional [patent] taking claim comes
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims ....
Summary judgment in favor of the
Government as the majority dictates is wrong as a matter of law, and is a denial ofplaintiffs
constitutionalrights.") (emphasis added).
111 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
142
See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000) (omitting a requirement the United States must use a
patented invention for a public use).
143 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353.
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1. The Supreme CourtRenamed the Public Use Clause the Public Purpose Test
Currently the Public Purpose Test remains the interpretation of the Public Use
Clause 144 courts apply when the Federal Government takes private property.1 45 A
constitutional governmental exercise of eminent domain requires the taking to
satisfy a valid public purpose, thus meeting the Fifth Amendment's Public Use
requirement. 146 Several Supreme Court decisions provide guidance as to what
1 47
constitutes a valid taking satisfying the Public Purpose Test.
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court said in Midkiff the Public Use Clause
1 48
never invalidated any taking rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo held taking land for economic
development unquestionably serves a public purpose. 149
Yet, if economic
development qualifies as a conceivable public purpose, then Kelo substantially
diminished the rights of private property owners, including patent owners, because
the United States can spin economic development to mean anything, making any
1 50
taking constitutional.

144 See gonerallyHawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
The public purpose test
allows the Government to use its power of eminent domain to take private property, with just
compensation, if the taking serves a public purpose, subsequent use of the condemned property by
the public is not required for the taking to be constitutional under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 240.
"[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause."
Id. at 241; "The role of the judiciary in determining whether [the state's police] power is being
exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954).
145 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662 (2005). During the nineteenth century

the courts required that the condemned property be put to use by the general public, either as a
park or land that was used by a common carrier which would also be open to the general public. Id.
This nineteenth century definition of public use would only allow the government to take a license in
a patent, using eminent domain, if the general public could make use of the same patent. Id.
Applying the use by the public test to taking a compulsory license in a patent would be impossible.
fd. (discussing the use by the public test as being difficult to administer and explaining that use of
the test eroded over time). For example, when attempting to apply the use by the public test, what
portion of the public would have to have access to the property to meet the public use requirement?
Id. And at what price? Id. The patent owner's right under 35 U.S.C. § 154 to exclude others from
making, using, selling, or importing the patented invention would be significantly diminished if the
public was also allowed use the Government's compulsory license to use or manufacture the
patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (granting patent owners the right to exclude others
from making, using, selling, and importing their patented invention).
146 Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241 (stating a taking for a public purpose is constitutional).
17 See generallyid. Berman, 348 U.S. 26; Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655.
18 Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241-42 (upholding the taking of land to break up a land oligopoly as a
conceivable public purpose).
149 Klo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
150 Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Under the banner of economic development, all
private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long
as it might be upgradedi.o., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems
more beneficial to the public--in the process."). See generallyZoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In Zoltek, the court alludes to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 remaining the only law courts
may look to when deciding if the complaining patent owner shall receive compensation. See id. at
1378 (Plager, J., dissenting).
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28 U.S.C. § 1498 exercises the Government's eminent domain power, 151 but the
scope of Section 1498 in terms of the Public Use Clause awaits adjudication in the
courts. 152 Although no court has held, or implied in dictum, that the scope of Section
1498 is unlimited, 153 no court has held or implied otherwise. To determine the scope
of the taking power in Section 1498, one can look to the Public Use Clause
interpretation in eminent domain cases for real property, or to the history of 28
U.S.C. § 1498 and its predecessor.
While Kelo suggests tangible takings in furtherance of economic developments
remain constitutional under the Public Use Clause, the historical development of
Section 1498 suggests a different result for intangible takings. Section 1498 and its
predecessor support the position the Federal Government can only take a compulsory
license to use or manufacture a patented invention for certain governmental needs,
such as the procurement of devices for war or to protect the nation from attacks and
the general welfare of the U.S. citizens. 15 4 It does not include economic development.
When the Court does decide the scope of Section 1498's taking power, it most likely
will limit the governmental takings to ones that satisfy the Public Purpose Test,
which, as explained above, will do little but frustrate the statute's original purpose of
helping patent owners.

2. Three Public PurposeScenarios Exemplifying the UnitedStates Taking
Power under the Fifth Amendment and 28 US.C. § 1498
An examination of the scope of includible public purpose takings of a compulsory
license in a patent requires an exploration of three different scenarios. First, can the
Government take a license in a patent in furtherance of national security and
defense? Second, can the Government take a license in a patent in furtherance of the
public health and welfare? Third, can the Government take a license in a patent in
furtherance of economic development?
First, the Government can and should always have power to take a license in a
patent in furtherance of national security and defense. Courts have always held
governmental takings of licenses in patents needed to defend the United States from
attacks, or procure supplies in the time of war, as conceivable public purposes. 155 In

151 Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 966-67 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (explaining the United
States uses 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as an exercise of eminent domain).
152
Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman, J.,
concurring) ('[28 U.S.C. § 1498's] application to all possible cases wherein patents may be infringed
by or on behalf of the government, whether or not grounded in 'public use' within the meaning of the
fifth amendment, has not been tested in the courts.").
153 Id. at 858 ("[U]ntil the issue [of public use requirement under section 1498] is presented for
adjudication it is inappropriate to imply, even in dictum, that Section 1498(a) is of unlimited
scope.").
151 See supra notes 72 and 75 and accompanying text.
155 Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesell-Schaft, 224 U.S. 290 (1912) (taking a compulsory
license in three of the plaintiffs patents related to improvements in guns and gin carriages);

Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (taking a compulsory license in a patent
for mechanically rechargeable metal-air batteries to be used in the field by the U.S. armed forces).
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fact, this policy drove the enactment of Section 1498's predecessor 156 to allow the U.S.
armed forces to procure contracts with government contractors for supplies needed in
World War 1.157 If Congress prevented the Federal Government from taking a
compulsory license to use or manufacture a patented device in furtherance of
protecting the country in a time of war, then it would make little sense to allow it to
exercise this power under any other circumstances.
Second, the Government can and should have power to take a license in a patent
in furtherance of the public health and welfare. U.S. Supreme Court cases on the
Public Purpose Test have defined the concept broadly and the courts have deferred to
the legislature's judgment on what constitutes a conceivable furtherance of public
health and welfare. 158 The Court, in Berman v. Parker,159 held the redevelopment of
a blighted area satisfies the Public Purpose Test and the Fifth Amendment.1 60 The
Court referred to the development project as benefiting the public welfare, stating
the concept was broad and inclusive.1 61 The Supreme Court in Strickley v. Highland
Boy Gold Mining Co.,16 2 a case allowing an aerial bucket line across the plaintiffs
land connecting the mountain side mines and the railways, held the public welfare of
163
Utah citizens required the state to use its power of eminent domain to take land.
The Supreme Court's broad and inclusive definition of public welfare in Berman and
Strickley exemplifies the view a public purpose benefiting the public welfare will
always satisfy the Public Purpose Test and the Fifth Amendment.
Third, the Government can take a license in a patent in furtherance of economic
development, but Congress should forbid government officers from doing so. If Kelo
applies to compulsory patent license takings, then the answer to question one in the
introduction - can the Federal Government unilaterally take X's patent and give a
compulsory license to P reasoning that it benefits the economy, public safety, or
public health? - is undoubtedly yes as to all three reasons; however, no patent case
1 64
has expressed such a holding.

156 The Act of 1910. The predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is the Act of 1910 as amended by the
Act of 1918 in the Naval Appropriation bill. Id. The Act of 1910 was enacted to provide additional
protection to patent owners from Government appropriations, as its title suggests. Id.
17 Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 345 (1928) ("The intention and
purpose of Congress in the Act of 1918 was to stimulate contractors to furnish what was needed for
the War, without fear of becoming liable themselves for infringements to inventors or the owners or
assignees of patent.").
158 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005).
159 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
160 Id. at 33.
101 Id.
162 Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
16: Id. at 531 (holding that the Utah legislature and the Utah Supreme Court determined that
the state required the ability to use the power of eminent domain to take private property because
the public welfare demanded aerial lines between the mines upon the mountain sides and the
railways in the valleys below).
104 Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (explaining courts have not determined whether 28 U.S.C. § 1498's application to patent
taking cases are grounded in the Public Use Clause within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment).
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3.Reconciling the Three Public PurposeScenarios
If the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court decides to apply Kelo to taking
compulsory patent licenses under Section 1498, then the small-time inventor X, in
the hypothetical above, will face an unfair situation. Recall smalltime inventor X
who invented and patented a process for producing an ultra sterile material used in
manufacturing surgical tools and medical devices.
Also recall P, a large
manufacturer, who convinced the United States to hire P as a government contractor
free to use X's patented process. Under the holding in Kelo, the United States would
have legal authority to take a compulsory license in X's patented process, reasoning it
benefits economic development. This situation represents X's worst nightmare
because P and the United States freely walked all over X's patent rights leaving
small-time X to sue the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, where the
United States will rigorously defend its action, costing X and taxpayers millions of
litigation dollars.
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was meant to prevent the
Federal Government from taking private property from U.S. citizens for private use
or gain. 165 The Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment remains the only
constitutional limit on the Government's takings of private property.1 66 The further
courts expand the interpretation of the Public Use Clause, the greater the
Government's power to constitutionally take private property gets, leaving patent
owners minimal legal theories to oppose the unfair takings.
The takings under scenario three are unfair to patent owners, because economic
development has no place in patents. The premise behind patents subsists in the
United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."1 67 When an inventor receives a patent, the
inventor not only receives the right to exclude anyone else from making, using,
offering to sell, or selling any patented invention,1 68 but the inventor also benefits
economically and financially. If the United States and P can take away X's most
important patent benefit (X's economic benefit) ex parte, then why would other
inventors patent their inventions?
Moreover, a thorough investigation of the historical development of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 reveals allowable public purposes for taking a compulsory license in a patent
include only takings in furtherance of procuring materials for war or public health
and welfare. Congress realized sometime between 1887 and 1910 if they did not pass
a law providing patent owners more protection from United States takings, inventors
would eventually curb their efforts towards patenting their inventions.1 69 The

165U.S. CONST. amend. V.
166 See id.
107 U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl.

8.

168 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). In part the statute says: "Every patent shall ...

grant to the
patentee ... the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States." Id. Soo also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002). The monopoly that the patent grants to the patentee is a property right
that is capable of being appropriated. Id.
169 The Tucker Act.
In 1887 The Tucker Act was passed allowing suits against the
Government in the Court of Claims on a theory of express or implied contract. Id. In 1910 the
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purpose behind the Act of 1910 became more evident with its 1918 amendment.
While the U.S. Navy was in desperate need to procure materials for World War 1,
patent owners obtained injunctions preventing the Navy's contractors from producing
patented inventions, thus interfering with the Government's procurement of
170
material.
The framers of the Act of 1918 were primarily concerned with the Act of 1910's
ability to frustrate the Government's war needs 171 and did not concern themselves
with expanding the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause to allow takings of
compulsory licenses in a patent for economic development. 172 The allowable public
uses for taking land and for taking compulsory patent licenses both stem from
eminent domain power, yet each type of taking needs a separate definition of the
Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause. Whether the United States taking of X's
patent process for P's use shall become allowable in the patent eminent domain
context depends on the U.S. Supreme Court's determination of the scope of the Public
Purpose Test and 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
The Court can either allow economic
development through the taking of compulsory licenses, or the Court can confine the
takings to public purposes in furtherance of war, national security, public health and
public welfare. If Congress fails to act and restrict governmental takings as
suggested, it appears the United States' power to take will remain only limited to pay
compensation and only when the United States practices the entire patent within the
boarders of the Country. 173 Next, subsection B takes a deeper look into Zoltek and
shows how its holding and analysis overhauls the patent eminent domain landscape
for patent owners suing the United States for compensation.

Government acted to give patent owners more protection from Government takings by enacting the
Act of 1910 providing the patent owners a means to obtain redress for Federal takings in the Court
of Claims without a need for a contract theory. The Act of 1910.
170 Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 345 (1928) (explaining The Act
of 1918 attempted to prevent government contractors from liability for patent infringement).

Now

28 U.S.C. § 1498, the Act of 1910's current form, even protects government contractors from

infringement suits while preparing to bid on a government contract, even if the patent owner
previously obtained an injunction against the contractor for infringing the same patent. Trojan, Inc.
v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (denying injunctive relief to the patent

owner because government suppliers are immune to injunctive relief).

171Shat-R-Shield, 885 F.2d at 858 (Newman, J., concurring) ("It is clear from the legislative
history that Section 1498(a) was not enacted to enable cheaper procurement."). The sponsor stated
"the 1918 amendment was 'necessary and urgent' as it would 'expedite the manufacture of war
materials."' Id. "Further, even in 1910 Congress was concerned about the effect on inventors and
innovation of such takings." Id.
172 TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1059-60 (stating Congress enacted the Act of
1918 at the behest of the Secretary of the Navy, who cited difficulties in procuring goods from
private manufacturers necessary to meet military requirements of World War I).
1:3 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005) (permitting a taking because
economic development serves a public purpose); see Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding the United States liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 only when it practices
every step of a method claim in the United States boarders).
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B. Zoltek - RestrictingPatent Owners to Suits Against the United States under
28 U.S.C § 1498
In Zoltek, the Federal Circuit faced a matter of first impression no court ever
addressed. 174 The issue raised on appeal, according to the per curium opinion, asked
if a patent owner could bring a cause of action in the Court of Federal Claims for
patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act.1 75 Justice
Plager phrased the issue quite differently in his dissent. 176 Plager phrases the issue
as whether "an owner of a United States patent [may] bring a cause of action under
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution against the United States for a 'taking " of
a property right.1 77 The differences in the wording result in vastly different analyses
and conclusions, because the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction includes actions
founded upon the Constitution, such as taking claims, but does not include torts,
178
such as patent infringement.

1. The InternallyInconsistentMajorityHolding ofZoltek Corp. v. United States
The per curium opinion based its analysis on Congress's response to the United
States Supreme Court decision in Sehillinger v. United States. 79 In Schillinger,the
Supreme Court held the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim of patent
infringement because the Court of Claims' jurisdiction did not include torts.180 The
majority in Zoltek asserts Sehillinger remains the law and continues to prevent
patent owners from suing the United States in the Court of Federal Claims for patent
infringement. 181
The majority's analysis recognizes the United States Supreme Court in Crozier
specifically noted when Congress enacted the Act of 1910, in response to
Sehillinger 8 2 Congress waived sovereign immunity allowing patent owners to sue
the United States in the Court of Claims for patent infringement.1 8 3 The majority
reasoned: if in 1910 patent owners possessed the right to sue the United States under
the Fifth Amendment for patent infringement, then why would Congress enact the

174 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1371 (Plager, J., dissenting) (asking if patent rights are some how less
of a property interest not worthy of the same constitutional protection as land).
175 Id. at 1349.
176See id.at 1370-71 (Plager, J., dissenting).
177 Id (emphasis added).
178 Compare id. at 1353 (holding the patent owner could not allege patent infringement as a
Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act), with id. at 1374 (Plager, J., dissenting) (explaining
a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment is not the same as an infringement action under Title
35 of the Patent Act). 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall

have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon

the Constitution, or ...for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.").
179 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350-53 (discussing Sehllhnger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894)).
IS0Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163,169 (1894).
1S Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350.
182
Id. at 1352 ("Congress provided a specific sovereign immunity waiver for a patentee to
recover for infringement by the government.").
183 Id.
at 1351 (citing Crozier v. Fried.Krupp Aktiengesellehaft, 224 U.S. 290, 303 (1912)).
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Act of 1910 specifically granting patent owners such a right, rendering the analysis
in Crozier flawed? 8 4 The majority's reasoning uncovers an important question, to
which Justice Plager offers an impressive answer discussed below in subsection two.
The majority's opinion suggests it realized the holding in Schillinger may not
apply to the current situation of a patent owner asserting a takings claim under the
Tucker Act. Nonetheless, the majority overlooked those realizations, stating "[t]he
life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." Thus, the majority refused
to allow a takings claim under the Tucker Act and followed the path of patent law as
it evolved under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.185
The per curium opinion recognizes a patent owner's sole remedy against the
United States for a taking rests in 28 U.S.C. § 1498.186 The majority fails to
recognize the statute's historical development, which is rooted in eminent domain
and the Fifth Amendment. 18 7 Case law reveals the statute's historical development
embraces the power of eminent domain as limited by the Fifth Amendment.18 8 The
Fifth Amendment limits the U.S. Government's eminent domain power requiring any
taking to be for a public use and provide just compensation.18 9 The inconsistency lies
in the majority relying on the Fifth Amendment's limitations included in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 and, at the same time, rejecting the notion that patent owners may use the
Fifth Amendment directly as a vehicle to obtain just compensation. "[T]he right to
just compensation for a taking is constitutional . . . and it requires no legislative

blessing." 190 How can 28 U.S.C. § 1498 rely on the Fifth Amendment, yet at the same
time restrict patent owners constitutional rights? According to Justice Plager, it
cannot, because Section 1498 and the Fifth Amendment are, as a matter of law, two
separate legal claims founded upon separate legal basis. 191

2. JusticePlager'sDissent Offers Patent Owners a Slight Sigh of Relief
Justice Plager argues the majority erred when it equated a takings claim with
an infringement claim. 192 Plager asserts "these are two separate legal claims
founded on separate legal bases." 193 Plager explains patent infringement is a tort

-8 -d. at 1351-52 ("Had Congress intended to clarify the dimensions of the patent rights as
property interests under the Fifth Amendment, there would have been no need for the new and
limited sovereign immunity waiver.").
185 Id. at 1352.
186 Id. at 1378 (Plager, J., dissenting) (explaining the majorities opinion that section 1498 is
the "sole remedy for a taking of a patent right.").
187 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
188 Soo supra note 81 and accompanying text.
189 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken forpublic use, without just

compensation") (emphasis added).
190 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1375 (Plager, J., dissenting).
Id.
192 Id.

191

193

Id.
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statutorily defined by Congress in Title 35; yet, a taking claim for just compensation
194
subsists in the Constitution, it is not a tort and requires no legislation blessing.
Justice Plager points our attention to Jacobs v. United States195 to answer the
majority's question as to why Congress would have enacted the Act of 1910 if patent
owners previously could obtain compensation in the Court of Claims under the Fifth
Amendment. In Jacobs the Supreme Court dealt with a Fifth Amendment taking
claim against the United States where the plaintiff sought interest on its award for
the government flooding the plaintiffs land.1 96 The Supreme Court granted the
plaintiff interest on its award for damages.1 97 The significance of the award of
interest to the plaintiff is that no statutory provision provided for interest. Thus, the
Supreme Court awarded interest solely because of the Fifth Amendment's just
1 98
compensation requirement.
Jacobs concludes the claim for interest was founded upon the Constitution of the
United States and that alone was enough for the Court to award just
compensation. 199 Plager explains that Jacobs clarifies that a taking of private
property was neither a tort claim nor a contract claim, but a separate independent
claim arising from the self-executing language of the Fifth Amendment. 200 Because
no one prior to Jacobs saw taking compulsory patent licenses as a taking and always
saw it as either a tort or contract claim, no previous court would have allowed patent
owners compensation under the Fifth Amendment. After Plager's explanation, one
can easily understand why the Court in Schillinger denied the patent owners
compensation and why Congress enacted the Act of 1910 in addition to the Fifth
Amendment.
Who is right, Justice Plager in his dissent or the Zoltek majority? The answer
shall come if and when Zoltek files and is granted a writ of certiorari asking the
United States Supreme Court to decide the issue. 20 1 This author believes Justice
Plager's view should prevail. The Supreme Court should hold that Zoltek may bring
a cause of action in the Court of Federal Claims against the United States for a Fifth
Amendment compulsory license taking under the Tucker Act. 20 2 Once the Court

'M Id.
195 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
196 Id. at 16.
197

Id

198

Id. ("That right was guaranteed by the Constitution....

The form of the remedy did not

qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary.").
199 Id. ("The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for property taken by
the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. That right was
guaranteed by the Constitution ....
The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution of the
United States.").
200 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Plager, J., dissenting)
("That has been the law at least since 1933. Today a cause of action under the Fifth Amendment's
taking clause is understood to be neither a tort claim nor a contract claim, but a separate cause
arising out of the self-executing language of the Fifth Amendment.").
201 As of the time this comment published, no writ of certiorari was filed by either party to
Zoltek Corp. v. UnitedStates, 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
202
Soo 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution ..
").
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applies Jacobs, the Court will undoubtedly cast Schilhngeraside and recognize that
whenever the United States takes a part of a person's private property, the United
203
States Constitution mandates that the Government pay just compensation.

C

One FinalBasisfor Allowing Patent Owners to Sue the Unites States under the
Fifth Amendment

The majority in Zoltek stated "direct infringement under Section 271(a) is a
necessary predicate for government liability under Section 1498."204 In order to hold
an infringer liable for a direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), the statute
requires whoever infringes to do so within the United States. 20 5 NTPtook the statute
one step further, holding "a process cannot be used 'within' the United States as
required by [S]ection 271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within" the United
States. 20 6 The Zoltekmajority applied the NTPholding to Lockheed's use of Zoltek's
patented process and held because Lockheed performed some of the patented process
out of the United States, the United States remains free from all liability to pay
reasonable and entire compensation as required in 28 U.S.C. § 1498.207
The injustices to Zoltek include: a lack of notice regarding Lockheed and the
United States' use of its patent; the Federal Circuit construction of Section 1498
denying Zoltek its only statutory remedy; and the Federal Circuit's holding that no
cause of action exists for patent owners under the Fifth Amendment. 20 8 If Zoltek
remains the law, then the answers to questions two and three posed in the
introduction - (2) can P intentionally use X's patented process out of the country to
evade all liability for the government to pay just compensation? (3) can Congress
strip X of its Constitutional rights granted to the citizenry in the Fifth Amendment?
- are certainly yes. 209 How did the Federal Circuit draft a holding that leaves patent
owners vulnerable to so many injustices when the United States has so many
protections private infringers lack?
For example, no patent owner may enjoin the United States from using its
patent. 210 The Government can hire a contractor to build whatever it desires without
even thinking about negotiations with the patent owner. 211 Moreover, the United

203
Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16 ("There was thus a partial taking of the lands for which the
government was bound to make just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.").
204 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350 (citing NTP Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
205 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
206 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
207 See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1347 (holding the United States is only liable for the use of a
method patent when it practices every step of the claimed method in the United States).

208 Id.
209 See

id. at 1347; see id. at 1378 (Plager, J., dissenting) (asking if Congress can withhold the
remedies and revoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment).
210 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
211 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
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States is never subject to treble damages, because when they take property under
212
eminent domain they do not infringe.
Clearly, the United States' ability to take compulsory patent licenses places it on
a different footing than regular patent infringers. Why does the Federal Circuit not
recognize this difference and correspondingly allow patent owners to sue the United
States for a violation of the Fifth Amendment, which contains a limitation on takings
applicable only to the United States? 2 13 Even though Lockheed practiced some of
Zoltek's patented process outside the United States, the steps Lockheed did practice
in the United States were nonetheless private property taken, for which the United
States must pay just compensation according to the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

III. PROPOSAL
Sections I and II frame the problem with 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the Public Purpose
Test, and eminent domain laws in general. After the Supreme Court decided Kelo in
2005, the Federal Government could apparently take any private property. 214 The
Kelo decision broadened the meaning of the Public Purpose Test, effectively
eliminating the Public Use Clause from the Fifth Amendment. 215 Additionally, after
Zotek, government contractors could easily traverse patent owners' only cause of
action against the United States, Section 1498, by simply practicing part of the
2 16
invention out of the country, revoking the patent owners' Constitutional rights.
Subsection A proposes the Public Purpose Test should exclude economic development
as a valid reason for taking private property satisfying the Public Use Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Subsection A also recommends Congress amend Section 1498 to
expressly limit takings of compulsory licenses in patents to takings in furtherance of
the preparation for war, national security, and public health and welfare. Subsection

212

Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (stating Title 35 allows for

remedies such as injunction and increased damages which are not permissible under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 because that would grant the plaintiff a recovery in excess of just compensation as required
by the Fifth Amendment and in excess of the reasonable and entire compensation authorized by
Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
213 Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (explaining the Fifth

Amendment applies only to the Government).
214 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005) (holding economic development is
in the realm of public purposes the legislatures can determine and implement takings over). For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court already held the Public Purpose Test satisfies the Public Use
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2665. Economic development is included as a public purpose
for taking land so any private property is now vulnerable if it can be improved upon. Id. at 2671
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 has its own problems because the statute
makes no reference to limits on the government's taking ability. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). One
could assume there is no limit because the statute gives power to take any patent at anytime;
however, on the other hand one could argue the statute exercises the government's eminent domain
power and must meet the Public Use Clause requirement. Id.
215 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing the Court effectively deleted the

words "for public use" right out of the Fifth Amendment's taking clause).
216 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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B proposes the Fifth Amendment applies to compulsory patent license takings and
forbids the United States from taking any amount of a U.S. patented invention.
Subsection B also recommends Congress amend Section 1498 to expressly state all
Governmental takings of compulsory patent licenses must comport with the Fifth
Amendment, no matter how much of the U.S. patented invention is actually practiced
in the Country.

A. Excluding Economic Development from the PublicPurpose Test
Since Kelo, patent owners face the prospect the United States will take a
compulsory license in their patents for economic development. 217 Taking property
from one private party and transferring it to another private party is
unconstitutional. 218 However, courts have held as long as the taking serves a public
purpose the Constitution is not violated. 219 The Kelo Court expanded the meaning of
public purpose to include economic development, making the subsequent private use
look more like a private benefit and less of a public benefit.

1. Proposal- Eliminate Economic Development as a PublicPurpose
To remedy Kelo's virtual elimination of the Public Use Clause, Congress should
add language to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 that expressly limits the United States' authority to
use eminent domain to take a license in a patent to when the taking is needed to
procure goods in the time of war and national security, or for the benefit of the public
health and welfare. The limiting language shall provide express protection to patent
owners, which the framers of the original Act in 1910 contemplated, 220 solidifying
221
patent owners' rights against government takings.
Patent owners' protection against Governmental takings concerns the framers of
the Act of 1910 the most. 222 The express language of the Act, "whenever an invention

217 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665. The Supreme Court made a determination that economic
development is a public purpose that satisfies the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment
potentially making all private property subject to eminent domain for the same reason. Id.

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
See id.at 2665 (holding when a taking serves a public purpose, it will satisfy the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment). However, the Courts have not held this directly in
relationship to taking a compulsory license in a patented invention.
220 See TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057 1059-60 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("28 U.S.C. § 1498
was adopted originally in 1910 and later amended in 1918. The Act [of 1910] was amended in 1918
at the behest of the Secretary of the Navy who cited difficulties in procuring goods from private
manufacturers necessary to meet military requirements of World War I.").
221 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). Section 154(a)(1) gives patent owners "the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States." -d. These rights will mean more if Congress
prevents the United States Government from taking licenses in patented inventions for economic
development reasons. Id.
222 Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesell-Schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 304 (1912) (explaining Congress
enacted the Act of 1910 to provide patent owners more protection than the Tucker Act).
218

219
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• . . covered by a patent . . . shall hereafter be used by the United States without
license . . . such owner may recover reasonable compensation, ' 223 suggests the Act
was created to provide a theory of recovery for patent owners against the United
States for reasonable compensation. Yet, some courts viewed the Act of 1910 as
granting the Federal Government the statutory authority to take any patent it wants
224
in good faith.
28 U.S.C. § 1498 and its predecessor did not allow the Federal Government to
take any patent license for several reasons. For instance, nothing would prevent the
United States from abusing its taking power if the Act of 1910 gave the Federal
Government the authority to take any patent it wanted and for any reason.
Additionally, if the United States is the patented device's only potential purchaser,
then patent owners' right to exclude others would be pointless. 225 28 U.S.C. § 1498's
taking power is not an exception to the Constitution; Congress must limit the
Government's takings power by statutorily forbidding economic development takings.
Purely private economic development takings should be forbidden under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 because when the Government takes a compulsory license in a
patented invention, the method of calculating the patent owners' compensation
demands it. When the patent owner sues the Government in the Court of Federal
Claims for just and complete compensation, the court conducts a hypothetical
transaction between a willing licensor and willing licensee. 226 This hypothetical
transaction produces a number the court uses to calculate the damages. However, if
the patent owner was willing to negotiate in the first place, no court would need to
determine a suitable number. When economic development is the underlying reason
for the taking in the first place, one can safely assume the patent owner would have
willingly negotiated a royalty rate if approached. However, allowing the Government
to bypass the real negotiation in favor of a court hypothetical negotiation is unfair,
unjust, and unconstitutional.

2. Solution -Amend 28 US.C. § 1498 to Expressly Limit Takings of Compulsory
Licenses in Patents
Patent owners need additional scope limiting language in 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to
protect from the United States overstepping its constitutional authority as it

22:

The Act of 1910. The Act read in full:
That whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States shall hereafter be used by the United States without license of the
owner thereof or lawful right to use the same, such owner may recover reasonable
compensation for such use by suit in the Court of Claims.

Id.
224

Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1166 (1980).

"Section 1498 authorizes the

Government to take a license in anyUnited States patent." Id. (emphasis added).
225 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
226 Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Courts have used "a
number of methods for determining just compensation in patent cases . . . [including]

a

determination of a royalty by postulating hypothetical negotiations between a willing buyer and

willing seller." Id.
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arguably did in Kelo v. City of New London. In order to implement the limiting
language, Congress should add a new paragraph to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) that would
read: "Acceptable public uses are limited to public purposes in furtherance of war and
national security, and for the benefit of the public health and welfare." 227 Under the

added paragraph the governmental taking of private property for economic
development would be forbidden. This addition will also serve to clarify 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 as an exercise of the Government's eminent domain power and simultaneously
make sure patent owners retain protection under the Fifth Amendment's Public Use
Clause.228

The historical development of the Public Use Clause went from allowing takings
where courts required the general public to use the property, to now where the
taking must only satisfy a public purpose like economic development. 229 Removing
economic development from the Public Use Clause, as it applies to 28 U.S.C. § 1498,
strengthens patent owners' protection against United States takings of licenses in
their patented invention. However, merely eliminating economic development from
the Public Use Clause still leaves patent owners vulnerable to the United States
contractors performing small parts of the patented invention out of the country to
avoid all liability.

230

B. ExpandingPatent Owners'Rights Under 28 U.S. C § 1498: No De Minim us
Standard
Zoltek left the United States and their contractors in a superior position over all
patent owners. After Zoltek, merely practicing a part of a patented invention out of
the country allows the United States, and their hired government contractors, to
avoid all liability for using any patented invention. This comment proposes Congress
amend 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to expressly prevent this result and overrule Zoltek.
No court should ever allow the United States to take private property without
providing compensation - whether the compensation is just compensation required
by the Fifth Amendment, 231 or reasonable and entire compensation required by 28

227 The proposed language should establish a new third paragraph added to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a).
228 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken forpubhlie use, without just
compensation) (emphasis added).
221) See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896) (holding that
satisfying the Public Use Clause does not require the land to be used by the public); Rindge Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (stating it is not essential for any considerable
portion of the community to directly enjoy the improvement on the condemned land to constitute a
public use of the land); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (explaining the need
for the general public to use the land when it is taken via the power of eminent domain is an out-ofdate doctrine).
2:30 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("We conclude that
under [Section] 1498, the United States is liable for the use of a method patent only when it
practices every step of the claimed method in the United States.").
231 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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U.S.C. § 1498(a).232 In order to cure the injustice Zoltek created for patent owners,
this comment proposes Congress overrule the holding in Zoitek233 and expressly state
in 28 U.S.C. § 1498 all takings of patented inventions must comport with the Fifth
Amendment in all respects. Specifically, when the United States takes a compulsory
patent license, no matter how much of the patented invention the United States
takes, the United States must pay just compensation.
The proposed amendment expressly recognizes patents as property protected
under the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, the amendment will reverse the Zoltek
majority's position that the limitations of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) govern United States
235
takings under Section 1498.234 The majority based its position on the erroneous
holding of NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., which held "a process cannot be
used 'within' the United States as required by Section 271(a) unless each of the steps
is performed within this country." 23 6 NTP should not apply to United States takings
of private property under Section 1498 because the government takes property; it
237
does not infringe patents, which is precisely what NTP and Section 271(a) address.
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment only applies to United States takings of private
property; the Fifth Amendment does not apply to private infringement actions under
Section 271. Thus, the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause never requires
a private infringer to pay the patent owner; the Fifth Amendment limits only the
United States, requiring just compensation for all takings of private property no
matter how much or how little the United States actually takes.238 Until Congress or
the courts limit the United States' taking ability of compulsory patent licenses, all
patent owners will remain subject to having their patent taken with the possibility of
23 9
not receiving compensation as required in the Fifth Amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Patent owners demand a certain level of protection from governmental takings.
Without such a level of protection future technological developments bear the risk of

2:32 Id.

("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensatio')

(emphasis added); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 ("The provision found in the fifth
amendment to the federal constitution, and in the constitutions of the several states, for just
compensation for the property taken, is merely a limitation upon the use of the power.").
2:3:3Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1347.
234 Id. at 1372 (Plager, J., dissenting).
2:35 Id. (basing their "conclusion on the erroneous assumption that a cause of action for
infringement of a patent by the United States under § 1498 is governed by the limitations of 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) .... ").
2:36 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
237 Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 967 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (stating the government
takes a license in the patent as a rightful exercise of eminent domain and an injunction is not
available). "When the [G]overnment has infringed, it is deemed to have 'taken' the patent license
under an eminent domain theory ..
" Id. at 964.
2:38 See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1378-82 (explaining an alternative reason for requiring the United
States to pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment even when part of the patented
invention is performed out of the country).
239 See id. at 1347; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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remaining secrets in fear of uncompensated Government takings. The framers of the
Constitution recognized the importance of issuing patents and promoting "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."240

Allowing an overreaching Supreme Court

decision to effectively eliminate the Public Use Clause from the Fifth Amendment,
reducing the Constitution and the Act of 1910's framer's visions of protection,
devastates the Fifth Amendment's limit on Government appropriations. 241 Moreover,
allowing the Federal Circuit to pave a path for the United States to avoid liability for
compensation altogether leaves patent owners with their hands tied behind their
backs.

242

The people of the United States require the proposed amendments to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 to restrict the Government from taking compulsory patent licenses without
having to provide just compensation. The future development of the country's
patented technology depends on the security and incentives 35 U.S.C. § 154 provides
patent owners. More protection from Government appropriations will maintain
consistent patented technologies and promote the needed "Progress of Science and
useful Arts."

240
211
242

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1247.

